

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 ANKARA 00101 01 OF 02 051744Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----076649 051751Z /42

O 051514Z JAN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 084

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 0101

NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR SECRETARY, NIMETZ AND VEST ONLY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: PFOR, TU, US  
SUBJECT: U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS

1. THE QUESTION ARISES, NOW THAT WE HAVE A NEW ECEVIT-LED GOVERNMENT, WHETHER I SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE AN EARLY APPROACH TO HIM, OR WAIT TO BE CALLED. MY INCLINATION, FOR THE FIRST WEEK OR SO AT LEAST, OS FOR THE LATTER. ONE REASON IS THAT ECEVIT MAY HAVE SOME DRAMATIC MOVE IN MIND TO MAKE ON CYPRUS, IF THERE IS ANY FOUNDATION TO RUMORS HERE. GIVEN THE SADAT EXAMPLE, I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED TO SEE AN INFUSION OF AUDACITY; A LARGE MOVE BY ECEVIT COULD REARRANGE THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE AND MAKE ALL OF YESTERDAY'S PRE-OCCUPYING CALCULATIONS OBSOLETE.

2. IT IS POSSIBLE ECEVIT WILL ASK TO SEE ME EARLY ON, AND I WOULD PREFER THAT, BUT IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT I WILL HAVE TO MAKE THE FIRST MOVE. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TOBE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE THE FIRST APPROACH IF REPEAT IF I COULD BE ARMED WITH THE ABILITY TO SAY SOMETHING FIRM AND POSITIVE ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS, SPECIFICALLY REGARDING THE DATE FOR A PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT ASKING THE CONGRESS TO MOVE ON THE DCA, PROVIDED THE UNDERSTANDINGS WE REACHED WITH THE DEMIREL

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GOVERNMENT ARE ADHERED TO BY THE ECEVIT GOVERNMENT. ECEVIT AND HIS NEW FOREIGN MINISTER WILL HAVE BEEN BRIEFED BY THE PROFESSIONALS ON THE STATUS OF OUR PRIOR CONTACTS, AND I AM PARTICULARLY CONCEREND THAT THE NEW TURKISH LEADERSHIP START OUT THE A POSITIVE VIEW OF OUR UNDERSTANDING AND THE ADMINISTRATIONS'

DETERMINATION TO CARRY OUT OUR UNDERTAKING. (I HAVE ASKED

CIA TO FLAG FOR THE ATTENTION OF VEST AND NIMETZ SOME MORE RECENT INTERNAL EVIDENCE OF THE TURKISH VIEW THAT, BY FAILING TO SPECIFY A DATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS AND WHAT THEY REGARD AS A TOO PASSIVE APPROACH TO HELPING SELL THE QUADRIPARTITE IDEA, WE ARE FAILING TO LIVE UP TO OUR PART OF THE UNDERSTANDING.)

3. IF I AM CALLED IN FOR A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE STATUS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, I WOULD PROPOSE TO SAY:

A. THE AMERICAN-TURKISH SECURITY RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN IN SOME DISREPAIR SINCE 1974 AND MOST PARTICULARLY SINCE EARLY 1975. IN SEPTEMBER OF THIS PAST YEAR, MY GOVERNMENT AND THE PREVIOUS TURKISH GOVERNMENT EMBARKED ON A SERIOUS EFFORT TO REPAIR THAT RELATIONSHIP. ON NEITHER SIDE DID WE POINT FINGERS AT WHO HAD DONE WHAT IN THE PAST TO DAMAGE THE RELATIONSHIP. WE SIMPLY STARTED FROM WHERE WE WERE TO SEE HOW WE COULD HELP EACH OTHER.

B. BOTH GOVERNMENTS WANT THE EMBARGO COMPLETELY LIFTED. ITS CONTINUATION SERVES NEITHER THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF TURKEY NOR THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES. IF IT HAD BEEN WITHIN THE POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO DO SO, THE DCA WOULD HAVE BEEN IN EFFECT BY NOW.

C. WE ALSO WANT PROGRESS TOWARDS A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT. CON-  
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TINUATION OF THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS DISTURBS GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS AND WEAKENS THE NATO ALLIANCE, AND, CONSEQUENTLY, DEEPLY EFFECTS U.S. INTERESTS.

D. WE BELIEVE EACH OF THESE PROBLEMS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH ON ITS OWN MERITS AND, AS THE PRESIDENT SAID PUBLICLY IN LONDON IN MAY, WE DO NOT CONSIDER THE TWO SHOULD BE LINKED. SUCH LINKAGE IS, IN OUR VIEW, IN FACT COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

E. NEVERTHELESS, THE PRESIDENT HAS A CONDITION AND NOT A THEORY TO DEAL WITH IN THE CONGRESS, WHERE THIS LINKAGE HAS BEEN MADE AND GIVEN LEGISLATIVE FORCE. WE HAVE A PRACTICAL POLITICAL PROBLEM ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION IN A WAY THAT WILL ADVANCE OUR OBJECTIVES OF RESTORATION OF OUR DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP SO THAT TURKEY CAN PROPERLY PLAY ITS EXPECTED AND REQUIRED ROLE IN NATO AND SO THAT WE MOVE THE GLACIER IN CYPRUS. THUS HEALING THE WOUND IN NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK.

F. FOR THE U.S. A MAJOR ELEMENT OF THE TURKISH CONTRIBUTION TO THIS PROCESS HAS BEEN ITS WILLINGNESS TO ELABORATE CONSTITUTIONAL, AND AT AN APPROPRIATE POINT, TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS. THIS WOULD PERMIT US TO SAY WITH CONVICTION TO DISPARATE

AUDIENCES, INCLUDING OUR OWN CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION, THE GREEKS AND THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL, THAT WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IN RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS THE TURKS ARE PREPARED TO DEPLOY REASONABLE AND FORTHCOMING PROPOSALS IN THE KEY AREAS THAT NEED TO BE RESOLVED IF A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT IS TO BE ACHIEVED. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS PRESENTED TO US AN OUTLINE OF TURKISH CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS. WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY OUR DISCUSSION, BUT FELT THAT THE TURKISH APPROACH WAS LACKING IN IMPORTANT RESPECTS, AS WE HAVE INDICATED TO MFA OFFICIALS. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT IN THE END, TURKEY MUST BE GENEROUS IN GIVING UP TERRITORY ON CYPRUS. WE HAVE NOT ASKED FOR AMAP. WE REALIZE THAT THE FINAL LINE MUST EMERGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT WITHOUT TURKISH GENEROSITY AS REGARDS TERRITORY THERE WILL BE NO CHANCE  
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OF A SOLUTION. IN PARTICULAR, REFUSAL TO GIVE BACK VAROSHA WOULD NOT BE VIEWED IN THE OUTSIDE WORLD AS A FAIR AND EQUITABLE POSITION.

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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 085

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 0101

NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR SECRETARY, NIMETZ AND VEST ONLY

G. THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMS HIS DECISION TO SEEK PASSAGE OF THE DCA IN THE CONGRESS THIS SPRING ON THE BASIS OF UNDERSTANDINGS ACHIEVED WITH THE DEMIREL GOVERNMENT AND WILL BE PREPARED AT AN EARLY APPROPRIATE POINT TO MAKE PUBLIC HIS DECISION TO ASK THE CONGRESS TO APPROVE THE DCA. THE EXACT TIMING OF HIS

EFFORT WILL DEPEND ON HIS JUDGMENT OF THE POLITICALLY MOST PROPITIOUS OCCASION. IN MAKING THIS COMMITMENT, THE PRESIDENT UNDERSTANDS THAT THERE WILL BE POLITICAL COST INVOLVED, BUT HIS INTEREST IN THE RESTORATION AND THE STRENGTHENING OF OUR RELATIONSHIP AND IN STRENGTHENING THE NATO ALLIANCE IS SUCH THAT HE IS PREPARED TO PAY THAT COST. FROM TURKEY, HE ASKS FOR ALL THE HELP YOU CAN GIVE, INCLUDING CONTINUED TROOP WITHDRAWALS, AND CONTINUATION OF WORK TOWARD AN EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT ON THE ISLAND.

H. ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY OF LESS INTRINSIC IMPORTANCE, WE REGARD AGREEMENT ON THE MISSING PERSONS ISSUE IN CYPRUS AS AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT SYMBOL OF THE ABILITY OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES TO WORK TOGETHER, AND WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD USE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE EARLY AGREEMENT ON THIS COMMITTEE. (OBVIOUSLY, I WOULD ONLY RAISE THIS IF THE ISSUE HAD NOT BEEN THEN SETTLED.)

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I. IF THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAS NEW IDEAS ON APPROACHES TO THIS PROBLEM THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH US, WE WOULD WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO. I WOULD BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND THAT OFFICIALS AT THE LEVEL OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, OR ABOVE, COME TO ANKARA AT AN EARLY TIME IF THEY GOT THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE USEFUL.

4. I WOULD WELCOME ANY COMMENTS DEPARTMENT WISHES TO MAKE ON THE ABOVE.  
SPIERS

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